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I. INTRODUCTION
He warned us.  For decades, Professor Bennett Gershman has sent a strong and 
consistent message that politics and prosecutors do not mix.1  And, of course, he was 
right.  Recent events have demonstrated the acute danger of prosecutors becoming 
immersed in the political world. 
This article will focus on just three examples.  There are many more that could 
be selected.  In fact, the Trump administration’s call to a recused Attorney General 
to shut down the investigation of Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller, or fire his 
Deputy Attorney Rod Rosenstein, can be seen as an ongoing debate about how much 
political influence there should be over the Department of Justice and any Special 
Prosecutors appointed for politically charged cases.2  However, three past situations 
should be more than enough to sound the alarm and provide key insights into why 
the current situation must be taken so seriously.  If a prosecutor wants to be true to 
the cause of justice, principle must come before politics.  Politics focuses on how 
individuals or groups seek to control the agenda and policies of the government.3  
By contrast, justice focuses on the fair and accurate result in individual 
investigations and cases.4 
* Professor of Law & David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles.  I am grateful to the outstanding work of my research assistant, Daniel Aronsohn, in helping 
with the research for this article.  It is an honor to write a piece recognizing, and building upon, the 
contributions of my friend and legal guru, Bennett Gershman. 
1   See, e.g., Bennett Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty of Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183 passim 
(2016). 
2   The obvious nature of this political battle and how it imperils the role of federal prosecutors 
was recently highlighted by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein in his speech to the annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association.  Rosenstein stated, “The Department of Justice, in which I 
serve, must never be a partisan actor.  Our agents and prosecutors are obliged to make neutral decisions, 
preserve personal privacy, protect national security and insulate investigations form the reality, or the 
appearance, of political interference.”  Lyle Moran, Rosenstein Says Lawyers Are Guardians of the 
Rule of Law, L.A. DAILY J. 1 (Aug. 3, 2018). 
3   Politics, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/politics (“The 
activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties 
having power.”). 
4   See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice, 26 FORD. URB. L.J. 607, 608, 615 
(1999). 
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Individuals who have proudly served in the Department of Justice have recently 
decried the attempt by President Trump to undermine the rule of law by trying to 
influence the investigation in individual cases.  For example, former assistant FBI 
Director and U.S. Attorney for Nevada Greg Brower recently stated:  
[I]t’s inevitable that if you serve in the Department of Justice or the 
FBI, it’s inevitable that you would have concern with respect to the 
almost...regular attacks on the integrity of the department and the FBI 
from the president over the last several months. It’s simply an 
unprecedented and untenable reality that is...harmful to the department 
and the rule of law.5  
 While President Trump has taken the politicization of the Justice Department 
to a new level, the concern over prosecutors focusing more on how their decisions 
might serve political agendas, instead of the fair result in a particular case, has been 
intensifying over the last decade. 
This article cannot tackle all instances of the politicization of prosecutors, but 
it offers three examples: (1) the U.S. Attorney firing scandal of 2007; (2) Sally 
Yates’ efforts to prevent the politicization of the Department of Justice under 
President Trump; and (3) the new era of prosecutors who use social media to 
embrace political views that would never be tolerated if they were expressed in the 
halls of justice. 
In 2008, Professor Gershman gave a lecture on “The Most Dangerous Power of 
the Prosecutor.”  In it, he identified the “politicization of the rule of law” as a key 
culprit in a pattern of conduct that would undermine U.S. criminal jurisprudence.6 
Of course, there are several ways that the rule of law can be politicized.  Judges can 
themselves become politicized.  However, another even more prevalent 
phenomenon is the politicization of prosecutors. Whether federally appointed or 
locally elected, prosecutors constantly face political pressures.  How they react to 
these political pressures can have a critical impact on the decisions they make. 
Today, there are those who actually embrace a more political role for 
prosecutors.  In his recent article, Professor Scott Ingram argues in favor of 
reconceiving the federal prosecutor’s role as the “government’s attorney,” not the 
people’s attorney.7  He argues in favor of detaching prosecutors from the obligation 
to do justice so that they can dedicate themselves to marginal cases supported by the 
5 Morning Edition: If Rosenstein Is Fired, His Departure Would Impact Mueller Probe, (NPR 
radio broadcast Sept. 25, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/25/651373763/if-rosenstein-
is-fired-his-departure-would-impact-mueller-probe (interview with Greg Brower, ex-head of the 
FBI’S Office of Congressional Affairs.). 
6   Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV. 1, 7 
(2008). 
7   Scott Ingram, Representing the United States Government: Reconceiving the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Role Through a Historical Lens, 31 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY 293, 
293-94 (Nov. 2, 2017).
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administration.8  For him, “prosecutors represent the government that hired them, 
just like any other attorney.”9 
Long ago, however, Professor Gershman correctly recognized that prosecutors 
are not like any other attorney.10  Rather, prosecutors have vastly more power, are 
more insulated from judicial control, and have immunity from suit for most of their 
actions that other lawyers do not enjoy.11  As such, it is critical that they are more 
than another political voice of government.  Their ability to fulfill Justice Robert 
Jackson’s vision of “doing justice” and serving the law,12 rather than factions, 
depends on them not becoming overly politicized. 
Thus, this article assumes that there is more mischief to be done by prosecutors 
who want to be a voice for political factions.  Part of this assumption is based on the 
problems that are created when prosecutors overtly join the political fray.  We must 
learn from these previous incidents and prevent them in the future.  We must learn 
from the lessons that Professor Gershman has been trying to teach us over the years. 
II. POLITICAL THREATS TO PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 2007 U.S.
ATTORNEY FIRING SCANDAL 
In 2006 the George W. Bush Administration made a political power play 
against United States Attorneys across the country.13  Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales asked for nine U.S. Attorneys to resign.  Though the Attorney General 
dubbed the firings “routine personnel decisions,”14 the circumstances suggested 
otherwise.  Each of the U.S. Attorneys was considered to be “qualified and 
demonstrably capable. . . .”15  In fact, many of the appointed successors were notably 
less experienced or qualified than their predecessors.16  This stark downgrade in 
8     Id. at 293. 
9   Id. at 338. 
10   See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992). 
11   Id. 
12  See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
3 (1940). 
13  See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation 
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 188 (2008); See also Laurie L. Levenson, Live and 
Learn: Depoliticizing the Interim Appointments of U.S. Attorneys, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 298 
(2008). 
14  Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says, WASH. POST, Jan 19, 2007 AT
A2. 
15  Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department Of Justice Politicizing the Hiring 
and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(Statement of Prof. Laurie Levenson on the Firing of U.S. Attorneys). 
16  See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 13, at 298 (“Interim U.S. Attorneys were appointed who 
generally lacked the prosecutorial experience or credentials of the seasoned U.S. Attorneys they 
replaced.”). 
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qualifications led many commentators to surmise that the removals were based upon 
political objectives rather than the proper exercise of independent legal judgment.17 
In support of that notion was the underlying commonality between all nine subjects 
of “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal”: their exercise of power as United States attorneys 
was inconsistent with the agenda set forth by the President and the Attorney 
General.18 
Until then, federal prosecutors traditionally had been insulated from political 
pressures in doing their work.  Recognizing that the heads of federal prosecutorial 
offices have the power to “wiretap people’s homes, seize property . . . put people in 
jail for life . . . destroy businesses, and affect the outcomes of elections,”19 the Senate 
Judiciary Committee called for an investigation of the firings.  Senators of both 
parties were concerned about what effect politics would have on prosecutors 
wielding their immense power.20  “The custom had long been that U.S. Attorneys, 
who were appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, submit their 
resignations only when a new president takes office.”21  However, the firing of 
Republican U.S. Attorneys during a Republican administration raised serious 
questions about the true motivation for the firings.  As it turned out, “[i]deologues 
in the Bush administration were unhappy with that tradition, and targeted attorneys 
for various decisions that, in their view, had hurt Republicans.”22  As John McKay, 
one of the terminated U.S. Attorneys, wrote, the administration “hoped to take 
advantage of a loophole in the Patriot Act that allowed the attorney general, rather 
than the president, to appoint interim U.S. attorneys, thereby bypassing Senate 
confirmation.”23  The administration was apparently motivated by raw politics and 
disappointment that the U.S. Attorneys had not done enough to further the 
administration’s political agenda, including contesting elections in which 
Republicans lost to Democrats.24 
17  Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of 
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 187, 205 (2008). 
18  See, e.g., Id. at 188-89 (“The discharges have led to allegations that DOJ influenced U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices to pursue the President’s partisan agenda by encouraging the overzealous pursuit of 
voting rights cases and government corruption cases against Democrats and by discharging individual 
U.S. Attorneys who resisted.”). 
19  Editorial, Why This Scandal Matters, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2007, at A18, 
https:// www.nytimes.com/2007/05/21/opinion/ 21mon1.html. 
20  David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 711 (2008). 
21  John McKay, Opinion, The Bush Administration Fired Me from the Justice Department Over 
Politics, VOX, May 15, 2017, http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/5/15/15641318/us-attorneys-
gonzales-bush-trump-justice-rule-of-law-scandal. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
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The use of prosecutions to defeat political opponents is a fundamental threat to 
democracy.25  If we believe in the “rule of law,” it must apply regardless of who 
inhabits the White House.  For that reason alone, prosecutors must remain apolitical.  
If not, prosecutors become nothing more than “political pawns.”26  The law no longer 
governs, but is trumped by the politics of those charged with fairly applying the law. 
While some, like Professor Ingram, might have little concern about this new trend, 
it is, as the U.S. Attorneys themselves recognized, contrary to their oath of office. 
U.S. Attorneys, like many other public officers, take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution, not the wishes of those in political power.27 
In the end, a report by the Inspector General of the Justice Department 
concluded that “there was significant evidence that political partisan considerations 
were an important factor” in the firing of the U.S. Attorneys.28  What harm did this 
political stunt cause?  In a short time, great damage was done to the credibility of 
the U.S. Attorney’s office.  First, there were allegations that political enemies were 
improperly targeted for prosecution.29   Second, less capable prosecutors were hired 
because of their political leanings.30  Third, politicizing the position sent a dangerous 
message to those who would choose to serve as federal prosecutors.  The focus 
became their personal, political advancement, not a commitment to upholding their 
oath of office.  Finally, the scandal called into question whether prosecutors should 
be given the broad discretion traditionally afforded to them.31 
25  See David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 711 (2008). 
26  See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 13, at 301. 
27  “I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Consitution of the 
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the 
same; that I take this obligation reely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I 
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me 
God.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1966). 
28  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006(2008), http:///www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final. 
pdf, cited in Gershman, supra note 1, at 6. 
29  In one such example, Georgia Thompson, a Wisconsin Democrat, was convicted of 
“misapplication of federal funds and mail fraud.”  Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power 
of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (citing United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 878 
(7th Cir. 2007)).  The prosecution of Georgia Thompson occurred just months before the election and 
was exploited in advertising against the incumbent Democratic governor.  Id. at 10.  In another case of 
political prosecution, Don Siegelman was indicted on conspiracy charges.  Siegelman, former governor 
of Alabama, was planning to run again for governor against Republican Bob Riley.  Upon later 
investigation by state attorneys, “[s]erious allegations have been made that Siegelman was targeted for 
prosecution to further the interests of the Alabama Republican Party.”  Id. at 12. 
30  Id. at 8. 
31  See Laurie L. Levenson, Live and Learn:  Depoliticizing the Interim Appointments of U.S. 
Attorneys, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 311 (2008). 
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Playing politics with prosecutions is the opposite of “the fair-minded pursuit of 
justice.”32  It was also an attack on fundamental principles of our government. 
Ensuring independent and fair prosecutors is not a transitory notion.33  Almost eighty 
years ago, Justice Jackson famously said, “The prosecutor has more control over 
life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”34  “In times of fear 
or hysteria political, racial, religious, social, and economic groups, often from the 
best of motives, cry for the scalps of individuals because they do not like their 
views.”35  The dangers of such an approach to prosecution are evidence.  Prosecutors 
should be vehicles for obtaining justice, not tools of revenge and domination. 
III. DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN:36 THE 2017 FIRING OF SALLY YATES AND
THE POLITICIZATION OF PROSECUTORS 
More recently, the Trump administration has tried its (heavy) hand at 
politicizing the Department of Justice.  On January 30, 2017, the newly inaugurated 
President Trump issued Executive Order 13769, imposing an impermanent ban on 
travelers from eight predominantly Muslim countries.37  Acting Attorney General 
Sally Yates subsequently issued a letter to members of the Justice Department 
declaring that she would not defend or enforce this executive order.38  Yates, whose 
position as Attorney General would be overtaken within the week,39 had publicly 
defied the President.  In response, President Trump fired her mere hours later.40 
While Yates was entirely within her authority to decline enforcement of the 
travel ban,41 her letter was curious.  Rather than addressing just the legality of the 
32  Id. at 28 (describing Robert Jackson’s speech to the U.S. Attorneys as to what their role 
should be). 
33  JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 20 (Lexington 
Books) (1980) (“[T]he American federal prosecutor at first enjoyed almost unlimited independence.”). 
34  Jackson, supra note 12, at 4. 
35  Id. 
36  YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 45 (Workman Publishing Company 2010) (1998). 
37  Carrie Johnson & Jessica Taylor, Trump Fires Acting Attorney General for Refusing To 
Defend Immigration Order, NPR (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/01/30/512534805/justice-department-wont-defend-trumps-
immigration-order. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Michael Shear, Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 
2017),  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html. 
41  See Letter from Sally Yates, Attorney General, to Lawyers of Justice Department (Jan. 30, 
2018) (“[I]t is my ultimate responsibility to determine the position of the Department of Justice in these 
actions.”); See also Jack Goldsmith, Quick Thoughts on Sally Yates’ Unpersuasive Statement, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/quick-thoughts-sally-yates-
unpersuasive-statement, (“The Attorney General . . . has the clear authority to determine which 
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executive order, she went further.  Yates explained that the order opposed the 
Department’s “best view of the law” and contradicted her institutional obligation “to 
always seek justice and stand for what is right.”42  Undoubtedly, the President’s 
travel ban was contentious.  It seemed to undermine fundamental American values 
by condoning religious discrimination under the guise of public safety.  But Yates, 
as acting Attorney General, had been tasked with determining whether the executive 
order was “on its face, lawful, and properly drafted.”43  Did Yates overstep her duties 
when she commented on notions of justice and the “best view of the law”? 
To begin, Yates was wholly aware of the President’s sentiments behind the 
travel ban.  During Trump’s presidential election campaign, he advocated for a 
“Muslim ban,” saying he would enact such a ban if he were elected.44  Once elected, 
though, President Trump strayed from that language and employed language of 
geography instead of religion,45 so the existence of discrimination was debated.46 
But given the previously apparent discriminatory animus, Yates could have easily 
refused enforcement of the executive order by citing its potential 
unconstitutionality.47  However, Yates declined to make the legal argument that the 
executive order was unlawful because of “invidious discrimination.”48  Instead, she 
invoked morality in her position as Attorney General, suggesting that this executive 
order contradicted “justice” and “what is right.”49 
presidential orders the Department will defend in court, and how, although her determinations are 
subject to presidential reversal.”). 
42  Letter from Sally Yates, Attorney General, to Lawyers of Justice Department (Jan. 30, 2018). 
43  See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 37. 
44  Fred Barbash, Muslim ban language suddenly disappears from Trump campaign website 
after Spicer questioned, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/05/09/trumps-preventing-muslim-immigration-vow-disappears-from-campaign-
website-after-spicer-questioned/?utm_term=.9d0668df495f 
45  Trump’s executive order stopped travelers from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, 
Somalia, and Syria.  Johnson & Taylor, supra note 37. 
46  At least 76 amicus briefs were filed in support and against Trump’s travel ban order.  See 
Joshua Matz, A Rough Guide to Amicus Briefs In the Travel Ban Cases, TAKE CARE, (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-rough-guide-to-amicus-briefs-in-the-travel-ban-cases. A key focus of 
many of those briefs was on whether the Order, given statements by Trump as a candidate, was more 
of an attack on Muslims than designed to focus on security threats by the listed nations. 
47  There was a strong argument at the time that the executive order would be unconstitutional 
if it were motivated by discrimination on the basis of religion.  However, in the recent decision in 
Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court determined, on a 5-4 vote, that subsequent versions of the travel 
ban were permissible.  138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).  It is unclear, though, whether this initial executive order 
issued by President Trump would have been found constitutional. 
48  W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L. J.
275, 349–50 (2017). 
49  Quinta Jurecic, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates Refuses to Enforce Trump Refugee EO,, 
Lawfare Blog (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/acting-attorney-general-sally-yates-
refuses-enforce-trump-refugee-eo. 
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Yates was criticized as being too political and for taking a position in  conflict 
with her duty of neutrality.50  Indeed, it is the election process which speaks to the 
ideas of right and wrong within American society.  On the other hand, a prosecutor 
need not and should not separate all notions of fairness and justice from her decisions 
as Acting Attorney General.  The line between formal ethics and personal integrity 
has never been well-defined.51  What is known, however, is that it is better for a 
prosecutor to be guided by ethical standards than political whims.52  Here, Yates had 
to “consider both the traditional deference of courts to the Executive in matters 
pertaining to immigration and border security, as well as the constitutional principle 
that disfavored groups should not be singled out for harsh treatment on the basis of 
religion or nationality.”53  In her best judgment, Yates determined that, on balance, 
the travel ban could not be enforced because it was inconsistent with important 
values. 
Furthermore, Yates’s letter was scrutinized for finding a gap—though the 
substantiality was ambiguous—between the “best view of the law” and the 
lawfulness of the executive order.54 But that finding was unnecessary and seemingly 
arbitrary.   
50  As one commentator described: 
Ultimately, however, in the American political system, the decision as to which 
governmental action will benefit “the people” or “the public interest” is vested in elected 
officials or those to whom they have delegated their decision-making authority.  Once that 
policy decision has been made, the government lawyer may ethically defend it . . . . The 
government lawyer, after all, is not employed by the federal government to represent 
personal interests, and it is virtually impossible for anyone to determine where a neutral 
view of the ‘public interest’ ends and one’s own personal opinions begin. 
Catherine Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 1015 (1991). 
51  Nelson Lund, Professor of Law at George Mason University, opined on the practical 
decision-making process: 
The genuinely difficult questions about right and wrong that [United States attorneys] are 
most likely to face in the course of their work are inevitably going to be resolved, not by 
professional ethics, but by personal standards of integrity and by implicit or explicit 
bargaining with their appointing official, the President. 
Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 65, 80–81 (1998). 
52  Courts have noted the importance of a U.S. Attorney’s role in abiding by ethical standards in 
the pursuit of justice: 
The United States Attorney is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation is 
to govern impartially . . . and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
53  Wendel, supra note 48, at 351. 
54  Jurecic, supra note 49. 
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[A] government attorney . . . does not have an obligation to seek the best
view of the law unless her client asks for this advice.  Instead, the
attorney’s ethical responsibility is to ensure that a proposed course of
action is legally permissible.  There may be a gap between something that
is permitted and the best view of the law.55
Perhaps it is specifically at the time of changing administrations, when political 
sentiments are at their height, that prosecutors must distance themselves from the 
political arena.  If they fail to do so, then the fervor of political change is likely to 
eclipse the longer-term commitments to principles of law and justice. 
IV. SELF-POLITICIZATION: HOW THE INTERNET HAS REVEALED THE
POLITICIZATION OF PROSECUTORS 
One of the greatest dangers of our time is that with the increased polarization 
of politics, prosecutors have boldly and publicly broadcast their personal political 
views without due consideration of how those views will be viewed by all of the 
constituents they are sworn to serve.  Some prosecutors seem not to realize that their 
on-line postings can dramatically undermine their claim that they are fair and 
independent advocates in the criminal justice system.  One of the most extreme 
examples happened recently with a gang prosecutor in Southern California. 
A. Michael Selyem
Michael Selyem was born in New Jersey.56  After spending some time in
Maryland,57 Selyem attended California State University, Fullerton, for his 
undergraduate education.58  He then attended UCLA School of Law from 2001-
2004.59  In August 2006, he joined the Central Hardcore Gang Unit for the County 
of San Bernardino,60 a unit dealing exclusively with the prosecution of gang-related 
crimes in the area.61  The unit’s website touts its office as being “hard on gang crime” 
and striving to “keep our communities safe.”62 
55  Id. at 350. 
56  Tom Cleary, Michael Selyem: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know, HEAVY (Jul. 9, 2018), 
https://heavy.com/news/2018/07/michael-selyem. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Michael Selyem, LINKEDIN  https://www.linkedin.com/in/ michael-selyem-0b70aa113 (last 
visited July 12, 2018). 
60  Id. 
61  Gang Unit, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, http://www.sbcountyda.org/ 
ProsecutingCriminals/ProsecutingCriminals/GangUnit.aspx (last visited July 12, 2018). 
62  Id. 
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In early July 2018, several of Selyem’s social media posts were uncovered and 
criticized.63  A staunch supporter of President Donald Trump,64 Selyem made 
derogatory and discriminatory comments targeting U.S. Representative Maxine 
Waters and former First Lady Michelle Obama.65  Additionally, he commented that 
the victim of a police shooting “got exactly what he deserved.”66  He supported the 
statement by writing, “[i]f the cops give you a directive then follow it.  Excellent 
police work sir!”67 
While the posts have garnered immense attention from the media, the legal 
community has also shuddered.  Selyem has jeopardized the credibility of his office 
and the perception of lawyers in public service.  Additionally, the validity of his 
prior cases is now in question.68  Did he bring these invidious biases into his 
prosecution of women, immigrants, liberals, and other groups he has deeply 
criticized?  As District Attorney Mike Ramos commented, “There could be motions, 
motions in limine before trial about some of the comments . . . racial biases, etc., 
because of the comments that were made.”69  Consequently, the San Bernardino 
County District Attorney’s Office reassigned his caseload and initiated an 
investigation.70  Selyem was placed on administrative leave until the investigation—
and potential disciplinary action—concluded.71 
A search of Michael Selyem on the California State Bar’s website shows no 
disciplinary record.  In fact, one of Selyem’s references on LinkedIn actually posted 
a remark touting him as “[v]ery disciplined and [an] ethical member of the District 
63  For pictures of the social media posts from Selyem’s social media accounts, see infra 
Appendices A–E. 
64  Selyem’s history of social media posts suggests a strong affinity for Donald Trump as well 
as a profound dislike for “liberal[s]” and “[D]emocrats.” Jessica Chasmar, Calif. prosecutor wonders 
why ‘ghetto’ Maxine Waters hasn’t been shot yet, WASH. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/9/michael-selyem-san-bernardino-prosecutor-wonders-w; see 
also infra Appendices B–E. 
65  See Eli Rosenberg, Prosecutor who reportedly suggested Maxine Waters be shot is placed 
on leave, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/07/09/ 
prosecutor-who-said-on-social-media-that-maxine-waters-should-be-shot-is-placed-on-
leave/?utm_term=.5a952fa59e6f; See also infra Appendices A and E. 
66  See infra Appendix C. 
67  Id. 
68  Joe Nelson, Public Defender Challenging Credibility of Suspended San Bernadino County 
Gang Prosecutor and DA’s Office, THE SUN, (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sbsun.com/2018/09/24/public-defender-challenging-credibility-of-racist-san-bernardino-
county-gang-prosecutor-and-das-office/ 
69  Rosenberg, supra note 65. 
70  Matt Stevens, California Prosecutor Put on Leave After Negative Comments About Maxine 
Waters, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/california-district-
attorney-maxine-waters.html (“An assistant district attorney has been assigned to examine cases Mr. 
Selyem handled in the gang unit.”). 
71  Id. 
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Attorneys’ Office in San Bernardino County.”72  Of course, it is Selyem’s ethics as 
a professional which is under immense scrutiny in recent weeks.73 
Selyem’s posts reflect exactly why the politicization of prosecutors is a 
particularly dangerous phenomenon, especially in these times.  Selyem praises 
police officers for shooting suspects, automatically assuming that the officers were 
in the right.  Selyem openly displays the prejudice by which he will make his 
decisions.  He dehumanizes others and mocks those who might have a different 
viewpoint.  His rhetoric is virulent and undisguised.  Professor Gershman warned 
against discriminatory charging and overzealous prosecutions.74 
Prosecutors have First Amendment rights,75 but they also have extraordinary 
power and responsibility.  By espousing racist, xenophobic and sexist views, Deputy 
District Attorney Selyem provides a horrifying example of why the politicization of 
prosecutors is insidious and dangerous.  When the Supreme Court decided cases like 
United States v. Armstrong76 and United States v. Wayte,77 it did so assuming 
prosecutors would act in good faith in their charging decisions. 
Improper social media posts, like those by Selyem, undermine the presumption 
of good faith that the Supreme Court has afforded to prosecutors for years.  Thus, it 
is a process that not only poses problems for defendants, but undermines the 
credibility of prosecutors in general. 
72  Michael Selyem, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-selyem-0b70aa113 (last 
visited July 12, 2018). 
73  See, e.g., Matt Stevens, California Prosecutor Put on Leave After Negative Comments About 
Maxine Waters, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/california-
district-attorney-maxine-waters.html; Paul LeBlanc, California Prosecutor Wonders Why ‘Ghetto’ 
Maxine Waters Hasn’t Been Shot, NEWSWEEK (July 8, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/san-
bernardino-prosecutor-maxine-waters-ghetto-michael-selyem-posts-1013216. 
74  Gershman, supra note 29 at 25. 
75  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The Court’s [public] employee-speech 
jurisprudence protects, of course, the constitutional rights of public employees.  Yet the First 
Amendment interests are at stake beyond the individual speaker.”).  The United States Attorneys’ 
Manual also has a section entitled “Personal Use of Social Media.”  One of the standards provides, 
“Department employees should not make comments that can be perceived as showing prejudice based 
on race, gender, sexual orientation, or any other protected bases.”  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 1-9.000, available at 
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-9000-special-masters (Apr. 2018). 
76  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 469-70 (1996) (in rejecting claim of selective 
prosecution, Supreme Court noted that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated 
defendants of other races because the Court was willing to afford “presumption of regularity” in support 
of prosecutorial decisions). 
77  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (Court afforded great deference to 
prosecutorial discretion based upon assumption that that prosecutors act in accordance with ethical and 
professional standards). 
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Professor Gershman was wary of the true motivations for prosecutors.78  With 
the increased politicization of prosecutors, we understand now why his concerns 
were so well founded.  As he aptly put it, “We want good prosecutors; we need good 
prosecutors.  Despite internal and external controls, the most effective control over 
a prosecutor’s abuse of power may lie in a prosecutor’s own personal integrity, his 
or her commitment to the cause of justice, and in a prosecutorial culture that prizes 
justice and fair play over winning a case.”79      
We are now in a world of extreme politicization of prosecutors and the results 
are predictable.  Only someone who thought that the ends justified the means could 
have written the hate-filled messages posted by gang prosecutor Selyem.  He 
certainly is not the only prosecutor who thinks that way, but the increased 
politicization of prosecutors has made him reveal his bias in ways that have not 
occurred since before the 1960s.80 
B. Jan Mann & Salvador Perricone
Michael Selyem is not the only prosecutor to use social media to express his
political views.  In fact, prosecutors have gone one step further.  They have turned 
to social media to express their views about pending cases and investigations. 
Jan Mann and Salvador “Sal” Perricone served in the United States Attorney’s 
Office in New Orleans, Louisiana.81  Mann was head of the criminal division; 
Perricone developed a reputation as “one of New Orleans’ most feared 
prosecutors.”82  In 2012, it was discovered that they had used various pseudonyms 
and social media accounts to comment on ongoing cases and political issues.83 
The prosecutorial misconduct was brought to light when a former federal 
prosecutor, Billy Gibbens, recognized a familiar writing style in an online blog.84  In 
an investigative report, the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional 
78  Gershman, supra note 1, at 1208-09. 
79  Id. at 1209. 
80  See, e.g., Moseley v. State, 73 So. 791, 791 (Miss. 1917) (district attorney told the jury that 
the outcome of the case was “just a question of whether or not you believe this negro or [a white 
man].”); Simmons v. State, 71 So. 979, 979 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916) (appellate court reversed because of 
grotesque racial politics expressed by prosecutor). 
81  Timothy M. Phelps, His Own Words Help Bring Down New Orleans Prosecutor, L.A. TIMES 
(Sep. 10, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-c1-new-orleans-legal-scandal-20140910-
story.html#. 
82  Id. 
83  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST FORMER ASSISTANT UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS SALVADOR PERRICONE AND JAN MANN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA (2013) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT], available at https://www.justice.gov/opr/file/884691/download. 
84  Phelps, supra note 81. 
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Responsibility found prosecutorial misconduct resulting from violations of 
standards set forth by the Office of Professional Responsibility.85  Specifically, their 
posts violated the Code of Federal Regulations,86 the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual,87 the 
Local Criminal Rules of the U.S. Eastern District of Louisiana,88 and the Louisiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct.89  Mann and Perricone deviated significantly from 
these guidelines by criticizing litigants and judges, as well as forecasting outcomes 
of ongoing cases. 
Mann and Perricone’s egregious posts established “a prejudicial, poisonous 
atmosphere . . . to impair the fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury.”90  They crossed the line from fairly, openly and honestly prosecuting 
cases to indulging their personal and political leanings by posting about their cases 
on social media.91 
For these prosecutors, their work had become a cause.  Accordingly, they felt 
that they could indulge their own personal and political leanings by using social 
media to influence public sentiment regarding the case. 
V. FUTURE CHALLENGES
Prosecutors will continue to face efforts to politicize their works.  For example, 
the Department of Justice recently requested that U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout 
85  See INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 83, at 45–
46 (summarizing the process for identifying professional misconduct by an attorney). 
86  28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (West 2018). (“[N]or shall personnel of the Department furnish any 
statement or information, which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public 
communication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to influence the 
outcome of a pending or future trial.”  Further, the regulations impose restrictions on permissible 
communications, generally limiting them to “incontrovertible, factual matters”). 
87  INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 83, at 47-48. 
(At the time of the investigation, § 1-7.550 contained several provisions which are seen today in § 1-
7.610 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.  These provisions prohibit members of the Department of Justice 
from disclosing “[o]bservations about a defendant’s or party’s character” or opining about a 
defendant’s guilt); OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 1, 
available at www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-9000-special-masters (Apr. 2018). 
88  INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 83, at 48–49. 
(“The Local Criminal Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana . . . restrict 
attorneys from making extrajudicial statements relating to pending cases or active investigations.”). 
89  INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 83, at 50–54. 
90  United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 620 (E.D. La. 2013); See also Brielynne 
Neumann, The 21st Century Online Carnival Atmosphere: Ethical Issues Raised by Attorneys' Usage 
of Social Media, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 749–51 (2014). 
91  Ben Brumfield, New Orleans Officers Convicted in Post-Katrina Shooting Get New Trial, 
CNN (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/19/us/new-orleans-trial-danziger-bridge-police-
shootings/index.html (as a result of their posts, five New Orleans police officers received a new trial 
after being convicted of conspiracy to cover up their killing of several unarmed civilians). 
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the country designate Assistant United States Attorneys who would help review, as 
part of the vetting process, the writings of Supreme Court nominee Brett 
Kavanaugh.92  This request raised questions about whether such assistance would 
insert prosecutors into the political process of obtaining the confirmation of a 
Supreme Court nominee, especially given the political split in views regarding this 
nominee. 
There are other scenarios that might also arise that could immerse prosecutors 
in ongoing politics.  For example, prosecutors may be ordered to attend a 
presentation by the Attorney General on a controversial subject,93 such as increasing 
the prosecution of certain types of crimes like minor immigration violations.  What 
rules should apply in such situations? 
The U.S. Attorney’s Manual provides minimal guidance about the role 
prosecutors should play in political matters.  For example, Section 1-4.410 prohibits 
employees from taking overt political actions such as making “a political 
contribution to their employer or employing authority.”94  However, the Manual 
does not otherwise guide prosecutors in navigating their duties in a highly-charged 
political arena.  Rather, it defers to the limitations on prosecutors under the Hatch 
Act, “which generally prohibits Department employees from engaging in partisan 
political activity while on duty, in a federal facility or using federal property.”95  The 
focus on these restrictions is on limiting prosecutors from taking active roles in 
political campaigns or posting partisan materials online.  It does not guide 
prosecutors in the day-to-day political quandaries that may arise.96  It certainly does 
92  See Katie Benner, Rosenstein Asks Prosecutors to Help With Kavanaugh Papers in Unusual 
Request, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/us/politics/rosenstein-
kavanaugh-document-review-prosecutors.html (President Donald Trump nominated D.C. Circuit 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill the seat of the retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy.  In an atypical move, 
the Justice Department has enlisted federal prosecutors to assist in reviewing the “long history of legal 
opinions” from Judge Kavanaugh.  Christopher Hunter, a former F.B.I. agent and federal prosecutor, 
expressed disapproval of the decision: “It’s flat-out wrong to have career federal prosecutors engaged 
in a political process like the vetting of a Supreme Court nominee.  It takes them away from the mission 
they’re supposed to be fulfilling, which is effective criminal justice enforcement”). 
93  See, e.g., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Talks Opioid Crisis in Louisville Speech, WKYT 
(Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.wkyt.com/content/news/Attorney-General-Jeff-Sessions-to-speak-in-
Louisville-471747304.html (setting forth how U.S. Attorneys must comply with new policies on 
addressing opioid crisis); Letter from Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, to Federal Prosecutors along the 
southwest border (Apr. 6, 2018) (on file with Department of Justice) (Memorandum ordering federal 
prosecutors to “adopt . . . a zero-tolerance policy” for immigration-related offenses). 
94  OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. JUSTICE MANUAL tit. 1, 
available at www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-9000-special-masters (Apr. 2018). 
95  5 U.S.C. §§ 7323–7324 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENTAL ETHICS OFFICE,
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/political-activities (last visited Aug. 11, 2018). 
96  Id. 
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not provide guidance for prosecutors who, by the very nature of their assignments, 
must navigate the political arena.97 
This article cannot anticipate all the situations in which prosecutors are going 
to be pressured to bend to political will, but it is worth considering what test 
prosecutors should use to decide whether a particular action deviates too much from 
the prosecutor’s role as a “Minister of Justice.”98 
One approach that may work would be to create a specific rule to identify the 
role of prosecutors in a manner which makes clear that prosecutors should act 
independently of partisan politics.  Their duty, as reflected in their oath, is to uphold 
the Constitution.99  However, blanket statements about a prosecutor’s role have 
proved to be insufficient to guide prosecutorial conduct in specific situations.  Thus, 
just as there are rules regarding conflicts of interest for counsel, as well as specific 
examples given in commentaries and cases, a similar approach should be taken to 
prevent the politicization of prosecutors.  Here is one approach for a specific ethical 
rule to preserve the independence of prosecutors: 
Proposed Rule: 
Prosecutors have a duty to remain independent and objective in their work.  
A prosecutor must preserve his or her independence by: 
97  Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. Director, Is Named Special 
Counsel for Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/05/17/us/politics/robert-mueller-special-counsel-russia-investigation.html. Although this article 
addresses primarily the role of federal prosecutors, state prosecutors face similar challenges. 
(Consider, for example, former FBI Director Robert Mueller’s appointment as special counsel to 
investigate Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. election.  The investigation of the presidential 
election process naturally evokes politics in almost every decision, thus putting Mueller under immense 
political pressure throughout the investigation). See, e.g., Ryan Martin, Kaitlin Lange & Tony Cook, 
Special prosecutor appointed for Curtis Hill Investigation—and It’s Not His First Rodeo, INDY STAR 
(July 24, 2018), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/24/curtis-hill-indiana-
attorney-general-special-prosecutor-
appointed/826870002/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=amp&utm_campaign =speakable (special 
prosecutor appointed by Indiana superior court judge to investigate state’s Attorney General Curtis 
Hill.  Hill, a Republican, has been accused of sexually inappropriate conduct.  The investigation has 
divided heavily along political lines, as one Republican attorney established a fund to defend the 
Attorney General). 
98  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1; Accord Abby Dennis, Reining in the 
Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 138 (2007) 
(quoting Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second 
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 
248 (1943); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935). 
99  5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2018). 
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1. Pursuing only those cases that have an independent, nonpolitical basis for
the charges;100
2. Engaging only in assignments that relate to the reform or enforcement of
the criminal laws;
3. Making no public statements supporting or attacking individuals because
of their political beliefs;101 and
4. Certifying at the time charges are brought that they have not been pursued
for political purposes.102
There are likely to be objections to these rules, but it is time to start a serious
conversation about the increasing politicization of prosecutors.  For those 
prosecutors who want to focus on the protection of the community, engaging in 
politics is, at minimum, a distraction.  For others, it can be a grave threat to 
prosecutorial autonomy and the public’s confidence in their work. 
VI. CONCLUSION
“My job as a prosecutor is to do justice.”103 
Bennett Gershman’s brilliance has not been that he knows all the answers 
(forgive me, Bennett).  Rather, he is willing to speak out when there is a problem. 
He makes us think about the problems confronting us and refuses to accept that 
nothing can be done about them. 
The politicization of prosecutors is not a transient problem.  For years, 
prosecutors have actually used their jobs as stepping stones to higher office.104  
Moreover, prosecutors using their offices for political purposes is also not a uniquely 
100  See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standard 3-1.6(a). (“A 
prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such as partisan or political or personal 
considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion”). 
101  See Joel Cohen, When Prosecutors Take Liberties With the First Amendment, Stroock & 
Stroock & Lavan LLP (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.stroock.com/siteFiles/Pub1297.pdf (While 
prosecutors retain First Amendment rights, there may be limitations on their speech because of their 
unique role.  Often times, courts will balance the interests of the attorney with those of the government 
in determining whether the speech is permissible); See also Chase Stevens, First Amendment Rights of 
a Prosecutor, WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2017/10/first-amendment-rights-of-a-prosecutor. 
102  In order to impress upon prosecutors their duty not to bring charges on a political basis, and 
to convey to the public that such a responsibility has been taken seriously, prosecutors should 
personally certify that they have complied with their ethical duty not to pursue a criminal action for 
political purposes. 
103  See Robin Abcarian, Sotomayor Hearings: The Perry Mason Influence, LA. Times (July 15, 
2009) (Justice Sonia Sotomayor, quoting Perry Mason, at her Confirmation Hearing). 
104  See Wendy Sawyer & Alex Clark, New Data: The Rise of the “Prosecutor Politician,” Prison 
Policy Initiative, available at: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/13/prosecutors/. 
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American problem.105  However, it is time that the issue be taken seriously in order 
to preserve the credibility of the position.  When politicians seek to influence 
prosecutors for political purposes, it undermines public confidence in the office. 
When prosecutors use their work as a platform to take political positions, it also 
undermines public confidence in their work. 
For these reasons, it is time to take steps to  insulate prosecutors from the whims 
of politics.  While it may be impossible to isolate prosecutors from all politics—
especially given that they are appointed positions that require funding from 
politicians—we can give them more independence by creating practice and ethical 
standards that will prevent them from being embroiled in the most egregious 
political battles.  There are three fundamental steps in doing so: First, recognize the 
problem of politicians trying to seduce or pummel prosecutors into helping their 
political efforts.  Second, set ethical boundaries on prosecutors’ political activities 
and vigorously enforce the standards set forth in the Hatch Act.106  Third, educate 
prosecutors and the public about the need for prosecutors to stay out of politics, 
including in their speeches and postings on social media.107 
If prosecutors do not take a stand, they will be swallowed by the morass.  
Politics is a swamp.  The temples of justice should not be. 
105  See Scott Horton, When is a Prosecution Political?, THE HARPER’S BLOG (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://harpers.org/blog/2008/02/when-is-a-prosecution-political. 
106 5 C.F.R. § 734.101-702 (2018). 
107 For standards that apply to federal prosecutors, see https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-7000-
media-relations 
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